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Assault With Intent To Murder - Necessity For
Actual Intent To Cause Death
Wimbush v. State1
Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder. The evidence indicated that prosecutrix left the
defendant, her paramour, and began consorting with another man. Some time thereafter the defendant approached
a car in which the prosecutrix was sitting and tried to
persuade her to return to him. When she refused, he drew a
concealed revolver and fired at least three shots, wounding
her in the arm, face and hand. The defendant later signed
a statement admitting the assault but denying an intention
to kill. At the trial, he testified that he was an expert
marksman, and could have killed the prosecutrix had he
intended to do so. The Court of Appeals in a per curiam
decision sustained the defendant's conviction. In so holding, the Court stated that there was sufficient evidence to
justify a conviction because the assault was admitted by
the defendant and the intent to kill was inferable from
the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the
body.' The Court went on to state that in order to convict,
it was not necessary that a specific intent to take life be
shown.3
If the Court means by specific intent an actual intent to
take life, and is promulgating the rule that in severe assaults a conviction will lie for assault with intent to murder
even though there is no actual intent to kill, then Maryland
has adopted a minority position with respect to the state
of mind necessary for the offense.
According to the usual view, assault with intent to
murder consists of two elements: an assault and an intent
to murder. The requisite intent element can be broken
down into two sub-elements: malice and an actual intent
to kill.4 Such malice is the same malice which is the essential mental element that distinguishes murder from manslaughter.' In an intentional killing, malice is the intentional doing of a wrongful act, dangerous to life, without
224 Md. 488, 168 A. 2d 500 (1961).
1 It should be noted that an inference of intent from the use of a deadly
weapon differs from the deadly weapon rule where intent Is presumed or
not required to be proven.
'ISupra, n. 1, 489.
'Williams v. State, 27 Ala. App. 504, 175 So. 335, 336 (1937) ; Craig v.
State, 205 Ark. 1100, 172 S.W. 2d 256, 258 (1943).
5 Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249, 257, 126 A. 2d 858 (1956).
3
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just cause, excuse or justification.6 The intention required

in malice refers only to the intent to do the act, e.g.,
knifing or shooting, not the intent to achieve a specific
result, i.e., death.7 In discussing the distinction between
malice and specific intent in assault with intent to murder,
the Georgia Supreme Court said in Adams v. State:'
"While, therefore, a presumption of malice will arise
from the use of a deadly weapon, a specific intent to
kill will not be presumed where death does not ensue,
and the existence of such intent is a question of fact
to be passed on by the jury."9
In addition to malice an actual intent to take life is
necessary to establish the offense of assault with intent to
murder.10 It is this intent which the law seeks to punish
and prevent, and which distinguishes the offense from a
simple assault. An intent to shoot, knife, etc., is not the
same as an intent to murder. Shooting at another is not
always done with an actual intent to take life; there may
only be an intent to wound or incapacitate.
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) 1109 defines "malice" as the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without Just cause 'or excuse, whereas
(at p. 1110) "premeditated malice" Is defined as an intent to kill unlawfully, deliberately formed in the mind as the result of a determination
meditated upon and fixed before the act; see also State v. Crutcher, 231
Iowa 418, 1 N.W. 2d 195, 199 (1941); State v. Jones, 133 S.C. 167, 130
S.E. 747, 750 (1925).
'Malice in non-intentional killings takes other forms. PERKNs, CRIMINAL
LAW (1957) 38. Malice may exist where one merely intends great bodily
harm; State v. Jensen, 120 Utah 531, 236 P. 2d 445 (1951) ; has a wanton
disregard of human life; State v. Wooten, 228 N.C. 628, 46 S.E. 2d 868
(1948) ; or where one intends to commit a serious crime other than murder
as in the felony murder rule, 1 WARREN, HoMocmE ('Perm. Ed., 1938)
§ 74, p. 318.
8125 Ga. 11, 53 S.E. 804, 805 (1906). There may be disagreement on
this point in the Georgia intermediate Courts of Appeal. Cf., Colbert v.
State infra, n. 14 and Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga. App. 124, 139 S.E. 80
(1927) ; however, see Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1927)
conforming to 168 Ga. 690, 148 S.E. 731 (1927) for a possible explanation.
Also see Gresham v. State, 46 Ga. App. 54, 166 S.E. 443 (1932) which
seems in accord with Colbert v. State, supra.
'Id., 805.
10Most of the cases and texts support this view. People v. Mason, 6
Cal. Rptr. 649, 653-654 (Dist. Ct. of App. 1960); Lewis v. State, 14 Ga.
App. 503, 81 S.E. 378 (1914); Vallas v. State, 137 Neb. 250, 288 N.W.
818, 820 (1939); Watts v. State, 151 Tex. Cr. 349, 207 S.W. 2d- 94, 97
(1947) ; State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 A. 447, 450 (1896) ; see also -Beall
v. State, 203 Md. 380, 385, 101 A. 2d 233 (1953), "[i]ntent is the essence";
40 C.J.S. 942, Homicide, § 79; 26 Am. Jur. 579, Homicide, § 600; CLARK &
MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) § 10.17, 651; also 12 M.L.E. 8, Homicide,
§ 5; MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) 29; P=INS, CRIMINAL
LAW (1957) 673; 1 WARREN, 0p. cit. supra n. 7, § 129, p. 568, "an Intent
merely to inflict great bodily injury, or to do serious bodily injury or to
punish or torture is not sufficient."
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Since the intent is subjective, it must be inferred from
the circumstances accompanying the assault." The use of a
deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body is only evidence from which an actual intent to murder may be in-3
ferred. 2 It does not establish intent as a matter of law.1
In Colbert v. State 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals said:
"To constitute the offense of assault with intent to
murder, there must be a specific intent to kill. This
intent is not necessarily or conclusively shown by the
use of a weapon likely to produce death, in a manner
likely to produce death.""
Nor does the actual intent to murder include necessarily
the elements of premeditation and deliberation. 6 The intent
may be formed in an instant. Premeditation and deliberation are requirements in most cases of intentional first
degree murder,'1 7 but, since murder has two degrees, there
may be an assault with intent to commit murder in the
second degree,' involving an actual but unpremeditated
intent to take life.' 9
To summarize the majority position on mens rea for
assault with intent to murder: malice and actual intent to
kill are combined so as to require an actual, but not necessarily premeditated, intent to kill, without justification,
excuse or mitigation. This state of mind may be proved
circumstantially but is not a matter of legal presumption
from any given factual setting.
The minority rule considers the character and degree of
harm inflicted by the assault as the aggravation necessary
to raise simple assault to assault with intent to murder.
This view holds the more general mental state of malice
sufficient and provides that actual intent to murder need
11
Craig

v. State, supra, n. 4, 257.
Webb v. State, 201 Md. 158, 161, 93 A. 2d 80 (1952) ; Lewis v. State,
209 Ark. 51, 189 S.W. 2d 641, 642 (1945) ; Davis v. State, 165 Tex. Cr. 294,
306 -S.W. 2d 353, 355 (1957).
11Supra, n. 10. See also Patterson v. State, 85 Ga. 131, 11 S.E. 620, 621
(1890).
1484
Ga. App. 632, 66 S.E. 2d 836, 837 (1951), reversing a conviction of
assault with intent to murder for failure to give an instruction that absent
intent defendant could only be convicted of statutory assault for shooting
at another.
IId.
"Cheeks v. State, 169 Ark. 1192, 278 S.W. 10 (1925).
"3 MD.CoDE (1957) Art. 27, § 407; see also Faulcon v. State, 211 Md.
249, 126 A. 2d 858 (1956), and Welsh, The Developing Law of International Murder in Maryland, 13 Md. L. Rev. 327, 329-331 (1953).
"State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 138 A. 132 (1927).
"Cheeks v. State, supra, n. 16; State v. Litman, id.
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not be shown; rather, it may be presumed from the seriousness of the assault. One statement of the minority position
is: if, death occurring, the defendant would have been
guilty of murder in the first or second degree; then, death
not resulting, he is guilty of assault with intent to murder."
In Illinois it is presumed that destruction of life was intended where there is an actual and wanton disregard of
human life evidenced by an act the natural tendency of
which is to kill.2 1 Such formulations make specific intent to
kill unnecessary, since intent to cause great bodily harm or
extreme recklessness is then allowed to satisfy the intent
requirement.
The requirement of actual intent has had a rather
complex history in Maryland. The significance of the use
of a deadly weapon may be considered first. In the recent
case of Johnson v. State,2 2 in which the defendant had
stabbed the victim in the back with a dirk, the Court indicated by way of dictum that the use of a deadly weapon
directed at a vital part of the body establishes the elements
of assault with intent to murder as a matter of law.23 However, in the earlier case of Webb v. State24 where the defendant had shot the victim through the neck, the bullet
barely missing the jugular vein, the Court said:
"To support a charge of assault with intent to murder it
is generally recognized that there must be proof of both
an assault and an intention to murder. The intent cannot
be inferred from the mere fact of the assault, although
the character of the assault and the use of a deadly
weapon are factors to be considered. * * * Neither can
:°1 WHMRTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 841, pp. 1131, 1132; for
cases involving the offense of malicious shobting with intent to kill see
Epps v. Comm., 190 Va. 93, 56 S.E. 2d 237, 241 (1941) ; Johnson v. Comm.,
135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673, 675 (1923). Cf., Merritt v. Comm., 164 Va.
653, 180 'S.E. 395, 399 (1935), where in reversing a conviction for attempted murder for failure to allege a specific intent in the indictment, the
Court said, "[t]he act charged here Is an assault. In order to raise this
assault to a more substantive crime, It must be done with a specific intent
to take life, the intent can not be Inferred from the act alleged."
"People v. Shields, 61 Ill. 2d 200, 127 N.E. 2d 440, 443 (1955) affirmed
a conviction of assault with intent to murder where defendant beat the
victim with his fists and kicked him, injuring him severely. See also
People v. Carter, 410 Il. 462, 102 N.E. 2d 312, 314 (1951) ; Harvell v. State,
155 Fla. 556, 20 So. 2d 801 (1945).
223 Md. 253, 164 A. 2d 267 (1960). See also Mason v. State ....
Md.
169 A.
..... 2d 445 (1961) which cites Johnson as authority for the
statement that stabbing a man with an eight inch knife at a point within
two inches of heart is sufficient to sustain a charge of assault with intent
to murder.
23Id., 255.
-201 Md. 158, 93 A. 2d 80 (1952).
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the intent be established as a matter of law from the
mere use of a deadly weapon."25
In Johnson, a knife was plunged into the victim's back; in
Webb, a bullet entered the neck and barely missed the
jugular vein. The respective weapons seem deadly, and the
respective wounded parts of the body appear vital. Under
the statement in Webb, which represents the majority
view, the character of the assault and the weapon used
give rise to only an inference of intent. Under the Johnson
dictum, which follows the minority view, intent is established as a matter of law.
This shift in emphasis to the minority view seems to
have been the result of another statement in Webb, which
dealt specifically with the nature of the intent which must

be proved. In a verbatim quote from

WHARTON,20

the Court

said:
"It is not necessary.., to sustain such an indictment
that a specific intent to take life be shown. If the intent
were to commit grievous bodily harm, and death occurred in consequence of the attack, then the case
would have been murder in the second degree; and, in
case of death not ensuing, then the case would be an27assault with intent to murder in the second degree.
is the sole authority cited in support of this point
in Webb. In the later case of Hall v. State28 the Court
affirmed a conviction of assault with intent to murder
where defendant, after breaking into the victim's home,
hid in an upstairs bedroom, waited until the victim was
alone, then hit him several times with either his fist or a
crowbar, knocking him unconscious, and removed $450
from his wallet. Citing Webb2" for the statement quoted
from WHARTON the Court said:
WHARTON

"If the assault were committed under circumstances
such that, if death ensued, the crime would have been
murder in either the first or second degree, it is not
2I.,
161. Emphasis added. This principle has been reiterated In Beall
v. State, 203 Md. 380, 385, 101 A. 24 233 (1953) ; and Davis v. State, 204
Md. 44, 51-52, 102 A. 2d 816 (1954). See also Couser v. State, 221 Md. 474,
476, 157 A. 2d 426 (1960), where the Court said, "The use of a deadly
weapon directed 'at a vital part of the body is a circumstance which indicates a design to kill."
WHARTON, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 20.
Supra, n. 24, 161-162. Emphasis added.
"213 Md. 369, 131 A. 2d 710 (1957).
2The

Court also cited Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 102 A. 2d- 816 (1954)

which will be discussed in this note, circa, n. 34.
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necessary to sustain such a charge that a specific intent
to take life should be shown."3
WHARTON's proposition would seem to completely eliminate any requirement of actual intent to murder in certain
situations. This would seem particularly true if the deadly
weapon rule is the basis for the statement in the instant
case and in Johnson. According to such view, if one directs
a deadly weapon at a vital part of the body, where, if
death occurred it would have been murder, then death not
occurring, it is assault with intent to murder.
If Maryland wishes to follow WHARTON'S far reaching
proposition, it would seem that a careful examination of
its rationale is mandatory. If the proposition rests, for its
validity, on being an affirmative form of the generally accepted negative principle that, if the offense would not
have been murder had death ensued, the defendant must
be acquitted of assault with intent to murder, " the fallacy
is apparent. To show that a state of mind inadequate for
murder is also inadequate for assault with intent to commit
murder, is not to show that a state of mind sufficient for
murder is also sufficient for assault with intent to murder.
The generally accepted principle merely eliminates convictions where, because of the absence of malice, any
homicide would have been manslaughter or no crime at all,
e.g., because of self-defense. It does not establish the
elements of the offense of assault with intent to murder; it
merely says that, absent malice, the offense has not been
committed.
Even assuming some other basis for WHARTON's proposition, the proposition still contains an inherent defect; it
is based on a double presumption. Not only must we
assume a murder which, concededly, did not occur, but we
must also assume an intent to commit murder based on the
10Supra, n. 28, 375. This statement seems to be the reiteration of the
Webb statement quoted from WHARTON. The Johnson case, 8upra, n. 22,
also cited the Webb and Hall cases for support of the proposition that use
of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body establishes the
offense as a matter of law. Careful research of the cases seems to indicate that statements of presumed intent and that specific intent Is no
longer necessary stem from the Webb case and its quote from WHARTON.
It is also possible that the robbery in the Hall case caused the court
to think in terms of the felony-murder rule and to extend the assault
rule by a novel analogy: the rule that a killing in the course of a dangerous
felony is murder would thus be extended to provide also that, at least
in cases of serious injury, an assault and battery in the course of a dangerous felony is assault with intent to murder.
M WHARTON, op. cit. supra, n. 20, § 841, pp. 1126-1128 and cases cited
therein.
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notion that a man is presumed to have intended the
probable consequences of his acts. However, since death
did not occur, how can we presume an intent based on a
result which did not occur? A presumption to be valid
and have force must have a sound basis and a high degree
of probability.3 2
Perhaps the minority view's rationale rests on an unstated assumption of policy that assaults which are in fact
very dangerous deserve to be treated in the same manner
as assaults accompanied by an actual intent to kill, or
that the triers of fact are likely to acquit too often of the
aggravated assault offense if told they must find an actual
intent. It would seem that such policy decisions would be
more appropriate for legislatures than for courts.

The authority for

WHARTON'S

statement is as uncertain

as the rationale. WHARTON cites but one case in direct
support of his view, and it does not appear to be in point.
The case is State v. Saylor.3 3 There, the trial judge quashed
an indictment of assault with intent to commit murder in
the first degree which alleged a specific intent to murder,
but failed to allege premeditation and deliberation. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the indictment could
be sustained as alleging an assault with intent to commit
murder in the second degree since second degree murder
does not require premeditation and deliberation. The
Court did not indicate that specific intent was unnecessary.

The case does not seem to support

WHARTON'S

statement

that "specific intent need not be shown", but seems rather
to indicate that premeditation and deliberation are not elements of specific intent.
It may well be that the Court in the instant case was
defining specific intent to include premeditation and deliberation and meant to indicate that specific intent as so
defined, i.e., intent to commit murder in the first degree,
need not be shown. Under this definition the Court would
not be eliminating the necessity of showing an actual intent to take life. That Maryland might adhere to this
special meaning of specific intent seems to be indicated in
Davis v. State.M There, the trial judge refused to give the
following advisory instruction, correct under the majority
definition of specific intent, for the defendant:
"Welsh,

The Developing Law of Intentional Murder in Maryland, 13

Md. L. Rev. 327, 335 (1953).
"6 Lea (Tenn.) 586 (1880).
"204 Md. 44, 102 A. 2d 816 (1954).
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"The circumstances must be such that if death had
resulted, the homicide would have been murder, and in
addition 3to
this, there must be a specific intent to
5
murder."
In sustaining the trial judge's refusal, the Court said:
"The appellant said at the argument that the first
prayer was intended to, and did mean, that the law is
that there can only be assault with intent to murder
if there existed a specific, wilful, deliberate and premeditated intent to kill. The prayer meant to instruct
the jury that it could convict only if it found that, had
death resulted, the homicide would have'36 been murder
in the first degree. This is not the law.
It would seem from this statement that the appellantdefendant was seeking to define specific intent to include
premeditation and deliberation, i.e., intent to commit
murder in the first degree, and that the Court may have
accepted this proffered definition. If the Court in the
instant case is so defining specific intent, then the statement
that specific intent need not be shown is in accord with the
majority view since even the majority does not require a
premeditated intent but only an actual intent to take life.
However, if the Court defines specific intent as an actual
intent to murder and means to imply that the intent to
murder need no longer be shown, then Maryland has accepted the minority view. If the latter view is the one to
be accepted, it would appear that the crime is improperly
labeled, "assault with intent to murder."
From the foregoing, it would seem necessary that the
Court should at the first instance define its conception of
specific intent. It is suggested that the specific intent
mentioned in the instant case should not be interpreted
as abolishing the necessity for an actual intent in Maryland, and, that the use of a deadly weapon directed at a
vital part of the body should be construed as merely
creating an inference of intent," and that the jury should
be so instructed. It is further suggested that the LegislId., 49.
Supra, n. 34, 49.
"Watts v. State, 151 Tex. Cr. 349, 207 S.W. 2d 94 (1947) reversed a
conviction of assault with intent to murder where defendant had fired
a shotgun at victim which wounded him in the chest, holding that the use
of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body does not give rise to a
presumption of law as to intent, but a mere presumption of fact, which is
rebutted by the defendant's testimony of lack of intent.

262
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lature should consider providing for those assaults, which,
although serious in nature due to their aggravating circumstances and the harm inflicted, cannot be punished as an
assault with intent to murder due to the absence of intent,
but deserve a more severe treatment than the simple assault.8 This might be done by creating an intermediate
offense such as "assault with intent to commit great bodily
harm."8 9
HENRY

F. LEoNN

G

Criminal Liability Of Parent For Omission
Causing Death Of Child
Palmer v. State1
Craig v. State'
In Palmer v. State, the defendant's child suffered prolonged and brutal beatings at the hands of the defendant's
paramour. Although the defendant was well-aware of
her paramour's sadistic conduct and had received many remonstrances from her neighbors, who were concerned
about the child's welfare, she did nothing to prevent the
beatings which ultimately proved fatal. In Craig v. State,
the defendant parents, because of their religious beliefs,
refused to call in medical aid when their child became ill
with pneumonia which subsequently caused the child's
death. In both cases the Court of Appeals found the parents
grossly negligent, but reached different results, since the
gross negligence must be the proximate cause of death to

113 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, J 12, provides for imprisonment from two
to fifteen years for assault with intent to murder. Note that simple assault
is a common law offense and may be punished by fine or imprisonment as
circumstances require, Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 466-467, 85 A. 2d 43
(1951). In the recent case of Shields v. State, 223 Md. 485, 168 A. 2d
382 (1961) a sentence of 8 years for assault and battery was held not to
be cruel and unusual punishment. It is conceivable that one could be
sentenced for more than 15 years (which is the maximum penalty for
assault with intent to murder) for simple assault. The Oourt could also
take into account what it believed to be Intent to inflict serious harm in
sentencing defendants convicted of simple assault. 'However, it would
seem that defendant's interest in having the trier of fact make a specific
determination supported by evidence might be better preserved, and that
administration might be simplified by the creation of an intermediate offense, particularly since simple assault is a misdemeanor and assault with
intent to kill is a felony. Art. 27, § 12.
"See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 201.10, p. 80 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1960) for the
offense of Bodily Injury.
1223 Md. 341, 164 A. 2d 467 (1960).
2 220 Md. 590, 155 A. 2d 684 (1959).

